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In this article I argue that the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has 
sanitized much of the revolutionary potential of human security. While 
R2P has not subsumed human security—the latter arguably involves a 
broader array of issues and themes which continue to be discussed—it 
has come to dominate the debate on the protection of human rights and, 
specifically, preventing and responding to mass atrocities. Whereas 
human security, in its early inception, constituted a challenge to the 
state-centric nature of the international system, R2P maintains the 
systemic status quo and treats states—and the state-based nature of the 
United Nations (UN)—as unalterable constants. While R2P is propelled 
largely by non-states actors, the strategic calculus focuses on altering 
the behaviour of states—a strategy I consider naïve and/or hubristic—
rather than reforming the state-based system in a way which coheres 
with the original human security approach of empowering individuals at 
the expense of states.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The refrain “something must be done” periodically rang out in the 
face of humanitarian crises in the 1990s and the Rwandan genocide 
precipitated an outraged chorus of “Never Again!”. Yet, precisely who 
should do the proverbial something quickly emerged as a contested issue. 
By the end of the decade, in light of the non-intervention in Rwanda and 
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the “illegal but legitimate” intervention in Kosovo, the existing 
regulations appeared unsuitable, if not anachronistic.  
“Human security” constituted in its early incarnation an attempt to 
challenge the existing system, specifically to revolutionise the locus of 
authority. Advocates dissented from the prevailing consensus regarding 
the immutability of the state-based system and fatalist conceptions of 
power politics, in favour of an agenda which was predicated on a radical 
reshaping of international politics. This movement has, however, through 
the rise of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), evolved into an 
acceptance of the status quo and a recognition of the Security Council’s 
primacy. The R2P industry champions moral advocacy rather than legal 
reform; the focus has become that of lobbying states to change their 
behaviour, rather than challenging the state-based international system 
per se.  
R2P is thus a restatement of the very international legislation and 
systemic regulations that suffered such disrepute in the 1990s and 
impelled the establishment of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which coined the term R2P 
in the first place. The revolutionary potential of the concept was, and 
remains, therefore, predicated on the notion that “good” people can 
influence the powerful to change their ways. This idea appears to have 
proven misplaced during the Arab Spring, and indeed, other crises—
most notably in Darfur and Sri Lanka—which have involved massive 
state-sponsored human rights violations since the concept was recognised 
at the 2005 World Summit. Clearly, there is a disjuncture between the 
world imagined by R2P and the reality. Too many within this industry 
have chosen short-term superficial acclaim and the hypocritical 
endorsement of the great powers, over a long-term struggle with all its 
attendant difficulties and challenges. So long as they do, they will 
sponsor a debate that obscures the real structural problems, which hinder 
the realisation of the goals of human security to the advantage of the 
purveyors of the systemic status quo.  
II. HUMAN SECURITY 
While the end of the Cold War certainly led to an upsurge in interest 
in both human rights, and humanitarian intervention, these issues had 
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been discussed, in some form, for millennia. The idea of using force to 
protect others can be identified in particular throughout the two-thousand 
year history of the just war tradition; indicatively, St Ambrose (337-397) 
argued forcefully that helping others was a divine duty noting, “he who 
does not keep harm off a friend if he can is as much in fault as he who 
causes it.”1 Gary Bass, indeed, provides many examples of this discourse 
and notes: 
[E]motional pleas were a regular feature of international politics 
throughout much of the nineteenth century, resulting in several 
important military missions. The basic ideas go all the way back to 
Thucydides, who, horrified at bloody ancient civil wars, hoped for the 
endurance of “the general laws of humanity which are there to give a 
hope of salvation to all who are in distress.
2 
Of course, evidence that these calls were made does not mean they 
were heeded, and the history of humanitarian intervention evidences few, 
if indeed any, instances of altruism; motives behind those putative 
“humanitarian interventions” of the past have always been mixed.3  
Yet, while the promotion of human rights in the post-Cold War era 
was not entirely novel, there was an aspect to the movement that did 
comprise something revolutionary in outlook. This was captured in the 
rise of “human security,” the emergence of a discourse which sought not 
just to have the rights of the individual recognised, but to place them at 
the top of the international political agenda—to make humans, rather 
than states, the referent object of security.4 Indicatively, Inge Kaul wrote, 
“[w]hat is needed today is not so much territorial security—the security 
  
 1. ALEX BELLAMY, JUST WARS: FROM CICERO TO IRAQ 24 (2006). 
 2. GARY J. BASS, FREEDOM’S BATTLE: THE ORIGINS OF HUMANITARIAN  
INTERVENTION 4 (2008). 
 3. Nicholas Wheeler & Justin Morris, Justifying the Iraq War as a 
Humanitarian Intervention: The Cure is Worse Than the Disease, in THE IRAQ CRISIS 
AND WORLD ORDER: STRUCTURAL, INSTITUTIONAL AND NORMATIVE CHALLENGES 448 
(Ramesh Thakur & Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu eds., 2006); Roberto Belloni, The 
Tragedy of Darfur and the Limits of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’, 5 ETHNOPOLITICS 340 
(2006). 
 4. Ken Booth, Human Wrongs and International Relations, 71 INT’L AFF. 103, 
110 (1995). 
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of the state—but human security, the security of the people in their 
everyday lives.”5 Given that the subject area of “international security,” 
and arguably the whole discipline of International Relations (IR), had 
focused almost exclusively on the state when discussing security, this 
discourse asserting the primacy of the individual constituted a radical 
challenge.  
Of particular novelty was that human security sought to consolidate 
the individual’s position as primary referent object of security by 
circumventing the state system.6 The means by which human security 
was to be championed, and its vision realised, some argued, was through 
non-state actors inhibiting the capacity of states to determine the 
international political agenda, specifically, by preventing them from 
behaving in ways contrary to the promotion and protection of human 
rights.7 The rise of human-security, according to Nicholas Thomas and 
William Tow, “imposes constraints on state sovereignty through the 
mobilization of international civil society,” which, they asserted, would 
lead to “‘the sharing of power between state and non-state actors in a 
globalising world.’”8 This aspect of the human security agenda was, 
therefore, centred on “global civil society”; though a “fuzzy and a 
contested concept,”9 this movement sought to “blend normative theory 
with international relations”10 and constituted a “set of diverse non-
governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the 
state and . . . prevent it from dominating and atomizing the rest of 
society.”11 Inspired by the civil society groups within Eastern Europe 
who precipitated the collapse of Communism in 1989, many sought to 
apply this radical “bottom-up” approach to the international arena, and 
  
 5. Inge Kaul, Peace Needs No Weapons, 47 ECUMENICAL REV. 313, 313 (1995). 
 6. Jessica Mathews, Redefining Security, 68 FOREIGN AFF. 162, 163 (1989). 
 7. Martin Shaw, Global Civil Society and International Relations 24 (1994). 
 8. Nicholas Thomas & William T. Tow, The Utility of Human Security: 
Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention, 33 SEC. DIALOGUE 177, 178 (2002). 
 9. Helmut Anheier et al., Introducing Global Civil Society, in GLOBAL CIVIL 
SOCIETY 2001 11 (Helmut Anheier et al. eds., 2001). 
 10. Jean Grugel, Democratisation Studies Globalisation: The Coming of Age of a 
Paradigm, 5 BRIT. J. POL. & INT’L REL. 258, 275 (2003). 
 11. ERNEST GELLNER, CONDITIONS OF LIBERTY: CIVIL SOCIETY AND ITS RIVALS 5 
(1994). 
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based their prescriptions on cosmopolitanism rather than those 
mainstream frameworks which, though heterogeneous, all recognised the 
traditional inter-state system as immutable.12 “Human security” in certain 
renderings, therefore, by definition articulated an alternative vision of 
international politics based on the idea of “[t]ranscending state 
sovereignty” so as to alter both the systemic rules and institutional 
architecture.13
 
This discourse won much support within IR, especially amongst those 
scholars who had grown frustrated both with the academic strictures of 
studying a narrowly defined rendering of “security” and the manner in 
which international politics was conducted with, evidently, little regard 
for the rights of people; this was arguably captured most succinctly and 
passionately in a speech given by Ken Booth in 1993 in which he decried 
the blinkered focus within IR and the callous nature of the state system. 
Calling for a “different discourse of international relations,” which he 
described as “global moral science,” he argued that the human security 
approach could revolutionise international politics; “[t]here is some 
space” he noted “for each individual on earth to make decisions about the 
direction of the next part of the human story.”14  
The interest in “human security” was not confined to academia; 
references to the term abounded in international political discourse and 
many official UN reports cited the term as the organisation’s goal.15 The 
early 1990s also witnessed a dramatic upsurge in optimism as to the 
UN’s future role; rather than being hamstrung by the competing interests 
of states, the UN was, some believed, posed to become a genuinely 
  
 12. MARY KALDOR, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY: AN ANSWER TO WAR 50 (2003); 
Interview with David Held, Graham Wallas Professor of Political Science, London 
School of Economics (Jan. 27, 2003). 
 13. Andrew Linklater, THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY: 
ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE POST-WESTPHALIAN ERA 109 (Charles W. Kegley, Jr. & 
Donald J. Puchala eds., 1998). 
 14. Booth, supra note 4, 119. 
 15. See S. NEIL MACFARLANE & YUEN FOONG KHONG, HUMAN SECURITY AND 
THE UN: A CRITICAL HISTORY (2006). 
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authoritative organisation capable of shaping the behaviour of its 
member states rather than simply reflecting their particular agendas.16  
While proponents of human security were not a heterogeneous 
mass—a diverse array of reflections and recommendations were made by 
myriad actors—two common principles provided a foundation from 
which the plurality of opinions proliferated; first, that the security of the 
individual was more important than that of the state, and second, that the 
existing system—the legal, institutional and political status quo—was 
untenable and had to change.17  Much of the revolutionary zeal 
dissipated, however, as the 1990s progressed; in particular, the idea of 
the UN taking a more independent, proactive and formative role in 
international politics had all but lost its potency by the end of the decade. 
Proponents of human security became increasingly orientated around 
mobilizing campaigns to appeal to states to change their behaviour; the 
idea of a radically different international system with formalized roles for 
non-state actors representing global citizenry evolved into a preference 
for the maintenance of the existing system with non-state actors acting as 
advocates, and at times, advisers to states.18 While this certainly involved 
a role for global civil society, it constituted, essentially, the various 
NGOs becoming international lobby groups; states retained their position 
of primacy and the international legal architecture remained the same, 
while global civil society activism centred on moral suasion.  
This was, however, a role which, some maintained, still enabled 
global civil society to effect real change in the area of human security. 
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was heralded as evidence of the 
capacity of global civil society activists to push states to act in the 
interests of those suffering abroad and catalysed a series of effusive 
reflections on the impact of the new “norms” proliferated by global civil 
  
 16. See MICHAEL N. BARNETT, THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORDER 21-
22 (2010); Mats Berdal, The UN Security Council: Ineffective but Indispensable, 45 
SURVIVAL 7, 9 (2003). 
 17. Nicholas Thomas and William Tow, The Utility of Human Security: 
Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention, 33 SEC. DIALOGUE 173, 178 (2002). 
 18. Nicholas J. Wheeler, Agency, Humanitarianism and Intervention, 18 INT’L 
POL. SCI. REV. 9, 22 (1997). 
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society.19 According to Mary Kaldor, “[b]y the end of the 1990s, it could 
be said that pressure from global civil society had given rise to 
widespread acceptance of humanitarian norms.”20 Likewise Nicholas 
Wheeler noted, “[w]hat emerges from a study of state practice in the 
1990s, is that it is not states but an emergent global civil society that is 
the principal agent promoting humanitarian values in global politics.”21 
Thus, while the system remained the same, the manner in which states 
behaved was ostensibly different because of the vocal advocacy of 
human rights groups. This was reflected in the Human Rights Watch 
2000 World Report which welcomed the “significant progress” recently 
made in the area of human rights protection; noting that “the 
international community displayed a new willingness to deploy troops to 
stop crimes against humanity,” the organisation thus heralded “the 
beginning of a new era for [] human rights.”22  
This optimism was predicated on the emergence of new “norms” 
rather than laws. The vision of a world more responsive to human 
security was, therefore, to be achieved not by actually changing 
institutions, but rather by changing the discourse of international politics 
specifically through the proliferation of “norms” which would, 
ostensibly, constrain state behaviour. Indicatively, Helmut Anheier, 
Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor wrote of the link between global civil 
society, norms and the acceptance by states of the human security 
discourse. “The changing international norms concerning humanitarian 
intervention can be considered an expression of an emerging global civil 
society. The changing norms do reflect a growing global consensus about 
the equality of human beings and the responsibility to prevent suffering 
wherever it takes place.”23 Thus, by 2000 the majority of human 
security’s proponents had largely determined that the most effective 
  
 19. Geoffrey Robertson, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
GLOBAL JUSTICE 88 (3d ed. 2006). 
 20. KALDOR, supra note 12, at 132. 
 21. Nicholas J. Wheeler & Alex J. Bellamy, Humanitarian Intervention and 
World Politics, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 470, 490 (John Baylis & Steve Smith eds., 2d ed. 2001). 
 22.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2000: INTRODUCTION 1 (2000), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k/Front.htm#TopOfPage. 
 23. Anheier et al., supra note 9, at 110. 
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means by which they could realise the goals of human security was 
through advocacy directed at the levers of power, namely states. Calls for 
substantive changes to the international legal system—though 
occasionally still advanced—were essentially drowned out by the more 
vocal discourse of norm proliferation and moral suasion. R2P was 
conceived at precisely this time and reflected this normative framework 
and political strategy.  
III. R2P: REAFFIRMING THE STATUS QUO 
The ICISS, established in the wake of NATO’s controversial 
intervention in Kosovo, acknowledged the problems with the existing 
legal system and cited as its first objective, “to establish clearer rules, 
procedures and criteria for determining whether, when and how to 
intervene.”24 This section argues, however, that R2P does not in fact 
achieve these aims as—in the absence of any legal innovation—it 
constitutes a reaffirmation of the very international legal system which 
was so discredited by the end of the 1990s.25 R2P comprises two main 
elements, the internal and the international responsibility to protect,26 and 
each is dealt with in turn below.  
A. The Internal Responsibility to Protect 
The foundational principle underlying the ICISS report was that 
“sovereignty,” rather than simply signifying an inalienable right to 
inviolability, imbued states with a set of domestic responsibilities.27 The 
2005 World Summit Outcome Document recognises this in paragraph 
138. “Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
  
 24. Int’l Comm’n on Intervention & State Sovereignty [ICISS], The 
Responsibility to Protect, at XI (2001), available at 
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. 
 25. PAUL CHRISTOPHER, THE ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE 248 (2004). 
 26. Often referred to as “Pillar 1” and “Pillar 3” respectively. See U.N. Secretary-
General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep of the Secretary-General, at 2, 
U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009). 
 27. ICISS, supra note 24, at 11. 
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against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such 
crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary 
means.”28 While this is, arguably, a laudable principle, whether it 
constitutes anything new—or was a meaningful commitment likely to 
have real impact—is debatable. The agreement reached in 2005 did not 
include any new means by which compliance with states’ internal 
responsibility would be regulated or, crucially enforced.  
Since at least the formation of the UN, states have accepted that they 
have certain responsibilities to their citizens and also that, though they 
may enjoy sovereign inviolability as per Article 2.7 of the UN Charter, 
they were prohibited from committing certain acts against their own 
people.29 Post-1945, states have been willing and able to agree on certain 
universal human rights laws—such as the Convention for the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the 
Convention against Torture (1984)—and thus, by definition, accepted 
that as sovereign states they had certain responsibilities to their own 
population.30 The principle of internal responsibility has not, therefore, 
historically been a source of great contestation.31 Indeed, in his 2009 
report, the UN Secretary-General acknowledged that Pillar 1 “rests on 
long-standing obligations under international law.”32  
Of course, compliance with international laws, treaties and 
commitments on human rights has been erratic.33 States are subject to 
  
 28. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 138, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 
(Sept. 15, 2005). 
 29. Ramesh Thakur & Thomas Weiss, R2P: From Idea to Norm–and Action?, 1 
GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT 22, 26-28 (2009); Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: 
Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99, 112 (2007). 
 30. See TODD LANDMAN, STUDYING HUMAN RIGHTS 14 (2005). 
 31. Alex Bellamy, Kosovo and the Advent of Sovereignty as Responsibility, in 
KOSOVO, INTERVENTION AND STATEBUILDING 42 (Aidan Hehir ed., 2010). 
 32. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep of the Secretary-General, 
supra note 26, at 10. 
 33. DAVID ARMSTRONG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 157 (2007); CATHERINE LU, JUST AND UNJUST INTERVENTIONS IN WORLD 
POLITICS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 54 (2006). 
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scrutiny by UN bodies such as the Human Rights Council (formerly the 
UN Commission on Human Rights), the Human Rights Committee and 
the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, yet 
compliance with even just the supervisory role of these organizations is 
poor and the enforcement capacity, and thus effectiveness, of these 
organizations is minimal.34 The result is a large body of both treaty and 
customary human rights law, which lacks a means by which these laws 
can be enforced consistently in the event that a state wilfully violates the 
law.35 Rhetorical commitments to accept a responsibility to protect one’s 
citizens have historically been, therefore, of dubious utility given the 
nature of the international human rights regime. 
States may well agree amongst themselves about the standards they 
should uphold domestically, but ultimately the necessarily domestic 
nature of compliance with these agreements limits the effect the inter-
state context of the original treaty can have. As Malgosia Fitzmaurice 
states, “[h]uman rights treaties are not contractual in nature and do not 
create rights and obligations between States on the traditional basis of 
reciprocity; they establish relationships between States and 
individuals.”36 With the exception of the possibility that the Security 
Council will determine that a situation warrants a Chapter VII 
intervention, non-compliance with human rights treaties results in 
negative consequences only for the domestic citizenry rather than other 
signatories to the treaty.  
The fact that states agreed again in 2005 to commit to protecting their 
citizens certainly did not constitute a unique occasion in the post-Charter 
era. The problem has not been the principle of internal state 
responsibility but rather regulating and enforcing compliance.37 
Additionally, the “four crimes” noted as being within R2P’s purview 
have long been prohibited under international law.38 In short, the idea 
  
 34. JULIE MERTUS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 7 (2009). 
 35. See Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, in 
RECUEIL DES COURS 11, 250 (1989). 
 36. Malgosia Fitzmaurice The Practical Workings of the Law of Treaties, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 187, 207 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2d ed. 2006). 
 37. AIDAN HEHIR, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INTRODUCTION 111 (2013). 
 38. Stahn, supra note 29, at 111. 
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that states have a responsibility, under international law, to protect their 
own citizens predates the emergence of R2P; clarifying that states have 
an internal responsibility was not, and is not, part of the problem R2P 
sought to solve.  
B. The International Responsibility to Protect 
The aspect of R2P that attracts most attention is the principle that if 
states fail to meet their responsibility to protect their own citizens this 
responsibility transfers to the international community.39 This, of course, 
raises a profoundly important question; in the event that a state 
manifestly fails to meet its internal responsibility, who can/should take 
action?  
In the 1990s, the Security Council expanded its interpretation of its 
Chapter VII powers to include intra-state humanitarian crises. Chapter 
VII empowers the Security Council to determine “the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and decide 
what measures—including the use of force—need to be taken. During 
the Cold War this provision was interpreted restrictively; in the landmark 
Resolution 688 in 1991, however, the Security Council declared, “[the 
Security Council] [c]ondemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian 
population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish 
populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace 
and security in the region.” This signalled a new willingness on the part 
of the Security Council to broaden its interpretation of Chapter VII to 
include intra-state humanitarian crises. Stretching this provision to 
include humanitarian crises provoked some controversy,40 but an 
intervention authorized by the Security Council has a very strong legal 
  
 39. AIDAN HEHIR, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: RHETORIC, REALITY AND THE 
FUTURE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 75 (2012). 
 40. See INDEP. INT’L COMM’N ON KOS., KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT,  
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 196 (2000); ARMSTRONG ET AL., supra 
note 33, at 132-33; see generally Nigel D. White, The Will and Authority of the Security 
Council After Iraq, 17 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 645 (2004). 
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case, and authorized interventions have not, historically, been sources of 
great legal contestation.41  
Of greater concern, however, was the inconsistent use of Chapter VII 
in the post-Cold War era; while the permanent five members of the 
Security Council (P5) reinterpreted their remit, they did not advance any 
coherent guidelines outlining how their new understanding of Chapter 
VII would be consistently applied; in his assessment of this “remarkable 
transformation” in the Security Council’s use of Chapter VII, Simon 
Chesterman observed that the application of this provision was 
haphazard, leading to “ambiguous resolutions and conflicting 
interpretations.”42 Action taken by the Security Council under Chapter 
VII, he noted, was driven by the national interests of the P5 at the 
expense of issues of procedural legality.43 The inconsistent and highly 
politicised manner in which the P5 authorised intervention led some to 
call for unilateral intervention; “illegal but legitimate” action taken to 
alleviate suffering without P5 support.44 This proved hugely 
controversial, however, as evidenced by the debate generated by 
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999. 
The ICISS warned about the potentially deleterious consequences of 
permitting unilateral intervention, but did suggest that such action could 
be potentially legitimate.45 Yet, the better option, according to the ICISS, 
was to continue to respect the authority of the Security Council; the 
report noted, “the [c]ommission is in absolutely no doubt that there is no 
better or more appropriate body than the Security Council to deal with 
military intervention issues for human protection purposes.”46 The task 
the ICISS emphasised “is not to find alternatives to the Security Council 
as a source of authority but to make the Security Council work much 
  
 41. Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
537-38 (2009). 
 42. SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? HUMANITARIAN  
INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (2001).  
 43. Id. at 165; see also ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 165 (2005). 
 44. INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, KOSOVO REPORT, 4 
(2000). 
 45. ICISS, supra note 24, at 55. 
 46. ICISS, supra note 24, at 49. 
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better than it has.”47 Recognising the obstacle presented by the veto 
power of the P5—evident during NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 
1999—the ICISS put forward the “code of conduct” proposal.48 This 
“gentleman’s agreement”49 was not included in the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document.50
 
Paragraph 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document recognised 
to the external aspect of R2P and the relevant wording in the paragraph 
stated; 
[W]e are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive 
manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, 
including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with 
relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means 
be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity.
51 
The centrality of the Security Council in authorising the 
“international” responsibility to protect remains, therefore, post-R2P. 
Ban Ki-Moon’s report on the matter also reiterated the absolute need for 
Security Council authorisation.52
 
As with the internal responsibility to protect, there was nothing new in 
the fact that states agreed in 2005 that the international community has 
the right to become involved in the domestic affairs of states.53 The 
Security Council’s use of Chapter VII in the 1990s had amply 
demonstrated that internal events, including humanitarian crises, could 
be deemed of international concern and importance, and potentially, 
  
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 51. 
 49. GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: ENDING MASS ATROCITY 
CRIMES ONCE AND FOR ALL 137 (Brookings Inst. Press 2008). 
 50. Alex Bellamy, Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian 
Intervention and the 2005 World Summit, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFFAIRS 143, 155 (2006). 
 51. 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 28, ¶ 139. 
 52. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep of the Secretary-General, 
supra note 26, at 25. 
 53. Monica Hakimi, State Bystander Responsibility, 21 EUR. J. OF INT’L LAW 341, 
343-44 (2010); see Peters, supra note 41, at 525. 
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grounds for external intervention; as Chesterman notes, “[b]y the time 
RtoP was endorsed by the World Summit in 2005, its normative content 
had been emasculated to the point where it essentially provided that the 
Security Council could authorize, on a case-by-case basis, things that it 
had been authorizing for more than a decade.”54  
Nothing has been achieved, and no changes to the international 
system have occurred, which, in any way, alter the legal process 
governing the response to intra-state crises to ensure consistency or 
automaticity. Paragraph 139 states that the international community, 
acting through the UN, has a “responsibility” rather than an obligation to 
act and that the Security Council is “prepared” to act. These changes, in 
conjunction with the reaffirmation of primacy of the Security Council, 
enable the P5, therefore, to determine what, if indeed any, action to take 
in response to a humanitarian crisis. There is certainly no new “duty” or 
“obligation” to act; indeed, following the publication of the ICISS report 
the P5 emphatically distanced themselves from accepting any obligation 
to take action,55 while during the course of the 2005 World Summit 
negotiations the reluctance of P5 states to accept anything approximating 
an obligation to intervene was very evident.56 As with the internal 
dimension of R2P, the external aspect of the concept comprises no novel 
legal compulsion or innovation. R2P’s utility, therefore, is ostensibly that 
it can be employed to put pressure on the Security Council to sanction 
action; a means by which the political will to intervene can be generated 
through the advocacy of those groups and individuals with the capacity 
  
 54. Simon Chesterman, “Leading from Behind”: The Responsibility to Protect, 
the Obama Doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention After Libya, 25 ETHICS & INT’L 
AFF. 279, 280 (2011), available at  
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/journal/index.html. 
 55. Jennifer M. Welsh, Conclusion: The Evolution of Humanitarian Intervention  
in International Society, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL  
RELATIONS 176, 210 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2006). 
 56. U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Letter dated Aug. 30, 2005 from the 
Representative of the U.S. addressed to President Ping (Aug. 30, 2005), available at 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/US_Boltonletter_R2P_30Aug05%5B1%5D.p
df; Theresa Reinhold, The Responsibility to Protect—Much Ado About Nothing?, 36 REV. 
OF INT’L STUD. 55, 67 (2010). 
2015] From Human Security to the Responsibility to Protect 689 
 
and financial resources to influence the behaviour of states.57 Whether 
the P5 are susceptible to the blandishments of concerned NGO’s, 
individuals and states is the focus of the next section. 
IV. MORAL ADVOCACY AND THE LEGITIMISATION OF STATE-CENTRISM 
R2P is predicated on a belief in the capacity of “good” people to 
convince states to change their ways and act so as to alleviate, or prevent, 
suffering beyond their borders.58 Legal reform is explicitly rejected by 
many as utopian;59 instead, R2P’s advocates imagine a world where the 
enlightened convince the recalcitrant to change their behaviour and 
disposition.60 R2P is “revolutionary,” therefore, because it creates a 
framework for ostensibly irresistible moral advocacy.61 R2P has become, 
in essence, a means by which normative pressure is consolidated and 
political will mobilised so as to change the decision-making calculus of 
the P5.62  
The fact that in recent years states have increasingly expressed their 
support for R2P has been routinely cited as evidence of the efficacy of 
the enlightened.63 Yet, when states express support for R2P, they are 
arguably engaging in a form of theatrics designed for public 
consumption; hortatory declarations of support for R2P, at most, 
minimally inhibit their behaviour. This is because R2P has been denuded 
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by powerful states of its more controversial aspects, meaning that today 
it is no more than a linguistic conceit that reaffirms the status quo.64 
Indeed, one must ask, why would states, particularly the Great Powers, 
not support such a nebulous concept? What possible disadvantages could 
result? The powers vested in the P5 have been reaffirmed by R2P and the 
structure of the system remains the same in all significant respects.  
Since R2P was recognised in 2005 a number of conflicts have 
erupted—or continued to rage—unaffected by this putative “norm.” 
Many indeed have pointed to the systematic state-sponsored violence in 
Darfur,65 the violence that ravaged the Democratic Republic of Congo 
and the Great Lakes region generally,66 and the “counter-insurgency” in 
Sri Lanka in 200967 as examples of conflicts, which have accrued little 
demonstrable benefits from the recognition of R2P in 2005. These cases 
each evidence an unedifying juxtaposition of the publicising of egregious 
human suffering and international inertia. Global civil society has 
certainly mobilized in response to many crises since 2005 but this has 
rarely led to remedial action by the “international community.” While the 
websites of many R2P advocacy groups contain myriad articles, opinion 
pieces, and transcripts of conference proceedings, which highlight the 
terms proliferation in international political discourse, it is not at all clear 
that this has much resonance outside the veritable “R2P bubble” that 
exists, particularly in New York. This has arguably been most obvious 
with respects to the response to the Arab Spring. 
A. R2P and the Arab Spring 
Since the Arab Spring began in Tunisia in December 2010 the world 
had witnessed a series of intra-state crises, often involving the massive 
loss of life. In certain cases—such as in Jordan and Kuwait—the tensions 
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between protestors and the government were resolved diplomatically, 
while in Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen the old order was deposed by the 
protestors. Others cases, however, were—and continue to be in the case 
of Syria—characterized by an escalation of violence by the regime; these 
are precisely the cases which have demonstrated R2P’s impotence. 
In March 2011 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973 
which sanctioned the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya. This led to 
a series of effusive declarations suggesting the action was evidence of 
R2P “working exactly as it’s supposed to.”68 The intervention certainly 
cohered with the spirit of R2P, but there is no evidence to suggest R2P 
played any role in the decision to intervene. The key development which 
impelled Resolution 1973 was the statement released by the Arab League 
on March 12, 2011, calling for military action to be taken against 
Gaddafi; this convinced the U.S. to support action and Russia and China 
to abstain on the resolution. In addition, a number of secondary factors 
aligned to facilitate the passage of the Resolution, including Gaddafi’s 
unique unpopularity in the region, Libya’s oil reserves, the proximity of 
Libya to NATO airbases, the country’s favourable demographic and 
infrastructural concentration along the northern coastline, Gaddafi’s 
unprecedented public promise to slaughter his opponents, and the vocal 
calls from within the “rebels” for support.69 There is scant evidence that 
R2P played a role Resolution 1973; the external dimension of R2P is not 
mentioned in the Resolution, references to the term in the negotiations 
preceding the resolution were made by three states—and only 
fleetingly—and none of the key states involved mentioned R2P in any of 
the public statements defending the intervention.70 This doesn’t mean 
that the intervention was somehow inherently mendacious or that R2P 
activists shouldn’t have welcomed it, but rather, that there is no evidence 
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that R2P played a causal role in the decision to take action. The national 
interests of the P5 happened to coincide with the interests of people 
suffering abroad; the intervention was, therefore, at most a welcome 
aberration in keeping with the pre-R2P trend evident during the 1990s.  
The aberrant nature of the action in Libya is further evident with 
respects to the Security Council’s response to Bahrain and Syria. The 
situation in Bahrain in March 2011 echoed that in Libya; the Sunni 
Monarchy faced calls from the majority Shia population for democracy 
and legal reform. Rather than accede to these demands, the regime 
sought military support from Saudi Arabia and Qatar. On March 14
th
, 
both sent troops into the sultanate to help the Khalifa Monarchy crush the 
popular uprising.71 The international response was minimal and to this 
day the Security Council has never mentioned Bahrain in either a 
resolution or a Presidential Statement. The U.S. has a naval base in 
Bahrain and the country is a key ally of Saudi Arabia, both of which 
appear to have contrived to limit any public denunciation, let alone R2P-
type action.  
With respect to Syria, some 200,000 people have now been killed in 
over five years of fighting.72 Despite a vocal campaign from a variety of 
human rights NGO’s, the response from the Security Council has been 
ineffectual and marked by pronounced divisions amongst the P5. Russia 
and China have on four occasions blocked resolutions seeking to censure 
Assad’s regime; again, like Bahrain, there is an obvious link between this 
stance and the geopolitical importance of Syria to Russia, in particular, 
and China. The Security Council’s response has been widely criticised; 
in September 2012 the General Assembly condemned the Security 
Council’s inaction; Kofi Annan stepped down as UN/Arab League Joint 
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Special Envoy for Syria in August 2012 decrying the “finger-pointing 
and name-calling in the Security Council” which had impeded his 
efforts,73 while Navi Pillay, in her final speech to the Security Council as 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, declared, “greater 
responsiveness by this council would have saved hundreds of thousands 
of lives.”74  
The importance of Bahrain and Syria for understanding the efficacy of 
R2P stems not so much from the fact that they constitute examples of 
states wilfully oppressing their own population; while this is clearly a 
violation of Pillar 1 of R2P, the existence of Pillar 3 is an 
acknowledgment that no proscription against egregious intra-state 
oppression can hope to be consistently respected. Rather, their 
importance derives from what they tell us about Pillar 3. While timely 
and decisive action undeniably took place in response to Libya, R2P was 
of no significant causal influence; geopolitics determined the (albeit 
possibly welcome) decision made by the P5. In both Bahrain and Syria, 
human rights violations listed as within R2P’s purview unequivocally 
occurred; in response, global civil society mobilized and called for 
action, not necessarily, it must be stated, military action. The Security 
Council’s response, however, has been characterised by disunity and the 
prioritisation of national interests over human rights. None of the four 
resolutions vetoed by Russia and China suggested military action but 
even the modest sanctions proposed were deemed contrary to Russia and 
China’s national interests.  
Where, one may ask, has R2P been during the crises in Bahrain and 
Syria? The generous answer is that it can be found in the agitation and 
campaigns waged by global civil society; these calls for “something” to 
be done, though arguably laudable, are cold comfort for those who have 
suffered so gravely at the hands of their respective national governments. 
Additionally, the fact that global civil society so vocally pleaded with 
  
 73. UN News Centre, Kofi Annan Resigns as UN-Arab League Joint Special 
Envoy for Syrian Crisis (Aug. 2, 2012),  
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42609#.VBAkIvldWSo. 
 74. UN Human Rights Chief Criticises Council Over Global Conflicts, THE 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/22/un-human-
rights-chief-criticises-security-council-over-global-conflicts. 
694 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 23.3 
 
states to take action arguably makes the inertia more damaging to 
perceptions of R2P’s efficacy as—unlike the genocide in Rwanda, for 
example—the campaign to “do something” was sustained and loud, and 
yet ultimately ignored.  
What, one may also ask, is the difference between the slaughter in 
Syria and the carnage in Rwanda and Srebrenica? Does the international 
response to Syria not evidence the same unedifying juxtaposition of 
human suffering, humanitarian appeals for action and inertia at the 
Security Council? In light of this, surely we must be wary of heralding 
R2P as revolutionary, or even significant. In the absence of any change 
to the international system—in terms of legal innovation or new political 
processes—the manner in which external actors respond to egregious 
suffering is remarkably similar post-R2P to what it was prior to the 
concept’s inception and subsequent recognition. The ICISS noted that 
one of its aims was “crafting responses that are consistent.”75 The Arab 
Spring suggests it has failed. 
V. THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF DARKNESS 
Many R2P lobby groups evidence two related prominent 
characteristics; a strong focus on the use of social media to promote the 
concept and an emphasis on celebrating the usage of the term 
“responsibility to protect” in political discourse. The result is a 
proliferation of tweets, e-mails and Facebook posts publicising occasions 
when R2P has made its way into speeches or policy reports. This 
approach gives the impression that R2P is dynamic, being increasingly 
endorsed, and becoming embedded in the international political lexicon. 
This approach coheres with the idea that “speech acts” and “discourse” 
constrain behaviour.76 What this fails to appreciate, however, is the 
yawning gap between rhetoric and reality. 
R2P advocates often take the rhetorical usage of R2P at face value, 
and axiomatically worthy of praise. As an illustration, in September 2014 
the Global Center for R2P published a list of every Security Council 
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Resolution that mentions R2P.77 Since the first reference to R2P in 
Resolution 1653 in January 2006, 26 Resolutions have mentioned the 
concept; 22 of these have been passed since the start of the Arab Spring, 
of which seven directly relate to the Arab Spring itself. While this may 
seem somewhat impressive, though it is worth mentioning that this 
number equates to 13.25% of the total number of resolutions passed 
during the Arab Spring,78 by way of contrast, during this period 16 
resolutions were passed on Somalia alone, some 9.65% of the total. The 
nature of the references made to R2P evidences a very definite, and 
potentially troubling, trend. In each of the seven resolutions passed, the 
reference to R2P is exclusively to Pillar 1, the internal dimension of the 
concept relating to the host state’s responsibility to protect its population. 
There is no mention in any of these resolutions of Pillar 3, the 
international community’s responsibility to protect. This could well 
indicate that the Security Council employs R2P so as to deflect 
responsibility for halting a crisis onto the host state; indeed, even prior to 
the Arab Spring, some warned that R2P was being used, paradoxically, 
to legitimise non-involvement in cases where one or more of the four 
crimes were demonstrably being committed.79 This trend is also evident 
beyond just the Resolutions related to the Arab Spring. Of the 26 
Resolutions that mention R2P, only four even acknowledge the existence 
of Pillar 3; none point to this as the basis for action. Thus, the fact that 
the Security Council mentions R2P a certain number of times, in and of 
itself, is not necessarily significant; the nature of the references must be 
examined as of course must the actual policies, if any, which stemmed 
from these references. It may well be, rather than a cause for celebration, 
actually a negative trend.  
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What this points towards is the superficiality of the contemporary R2P 
advocacy; rather than challenging states, the statements they make are 
often taken at face value and lauded as evidence of progress. The P5, of 
course, are naturally reluctant to publicly declare its intention to act 
without concern for human rights and, thus, unsurprisingly issue general 
statements supportive of R2P, and indeed myriad other cause célèbre. 
Hence, there is little shortage of ostensibly “good” news. In fact, what 
this evidences is that the discourse of human rights, and indeed the 
radical challenge posed initially by “human security,” has been co-opted, 
sanitised and employed by the powerful to legitimise their privileged 
position.  
The vision of the R2P advocates, and the contrasting real world of 
international politics, coheres with the Reinhold Niebuhr’s distinction 
between the “children of light and the children of darkness.” Though 
writing in a very different era, the parallels between Niebuhr’s critique of 
naivety resonates with R2P’s contemporary predicament. Niebuhr 
defined the children of light as, “those who seek to bring self-interest . . . 
in harmony with a more universal good.”80 This group comprised those 
who sought to contrive strategies for global reform without an 
appreciation of the nature of the actors who determine the contours of the 
system and, naturally, have an interest in its perpetuation. Niebuhr 
criticised, “[t]he social and historical optimism” prevalent among this 
group as, “the typical illusion of an advancing class which mistook its 
own progress for the progress of the world.”81 The children of light seek 
to propel human progress without recognising the existence of the 
“children of darkness” who take advantage of the normative idealism of 
the children of light. While the children of light imagine a world where 
progress is inevitable and impelled by rational argument and moral 
suasion—and accept promises at face value—the children of darkness 
exploit regulatory weaknesses and the malleability of moral norms to 
pursue their own self-interest. The children of light, Niebuhr argues, 
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Are virtuous because they have some conception of a higher law than 
their own will. They are usually foolish because they do not know the 
power of self-will. They underestimate the peril of anarchy in both the 
national and the international community. Modern democratic 
civilisation . . . has an easy solution for the problem of anarchy and 
chaos on both the national and international level of community, 
because of its fatuous and superficial view of man. It does not know 
that the same man who is ostensibly devoted to the “common good” 
may have desires and ambitions, hopes and fears, which set him at 
variance with his neighbour.
82
  
Democracy exists, Niebuhr argues, not because man is inherently 
virtuous but precisely because man is not.83 It can only work if 
constructed in concert with legal principles, which are designed to 
mitigate the influence of these negatives, such as duty, punishment and 
judicial probity. Niebuhr’s key point of greatest relevance to the debate 
on R2P is the dangers inherent in assuming that self-interest can be 
harnessed by moral advocacy without concomitant legal regulation and 
the establishment of punitive capacity. “The children of light,” Niebuhr 
argued, “have not been as wise as the children of darkness.” The fatal 
mistake they have made, he warned, is that they “underestimated the 
power of self-interest.”84 Self-interest, therefore exists, and will likely 
always exist, but this need not induce fatalism. Niebuhr does not suggest 
the international system is immutable; evolution—progress even—is 
certainly possible, but it cannot be generated by good intentions and 
moral appeals alone. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The vision of a world no longer dominated by the national interests of 
states and oriented around human security was revolutionary, and thus, it 
is counter-intuitive to expect change of this magnitude whilst affirming 
the status quo. Even with the endorsement of R2P by states in 2005, 
nothing has actually changed to compel states or the P5 to alter their 
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behaviour; the Arab Spring demonstrates that the P5 have little 
compunction about ignoring certain crises or blocking international 
efforts to alleviate others. The idea that the P5 are today less likely to 
veto interventions because of the existence of vocal proponents of R2P 
does not equate with reality, certainly not the P5’s response to the crisis 
in Syria. As yet, overtly blocking remedial action does not carry 
sufficient disincentives for the P5. As Allen Buchanan and Robert 
Keohane note, “[t]he permanent members most likely to use the veto 
against humanitarian intervention are extremely powerful and not likely 
to suffer severe political or economic consequences for using it to thwart 
such interventions.”85 The well-funded and vocal advocacy of many 
R2P-orientated NGOs can, certainly potentially, make inaction less easy 
to justify, but hardly impossible, and surely a modest return on the time, 
money and energy expounded on R2P to date. As Chesterman notes, 
“anxiety about doing nothing is a far cry from effective intervention to 
protect the population at risk.”86  
In his 1993 speech extolling the virtues of human security and calling 
for a radical reorganisation of the international system, Booth warned 
against “self-deception,” the tendency amongst observers of international 
politics to see what they want at the expense of the real.87 This had turned 
many, he argued, into “house trained ‘critics’ of the powerful” who 
ultimately, “always adjust to their rulers agendas and flatter the power 
which is ruling.”88 Without radical change, the international system 
would continue, Booth warned, to be unresponsive to human rights. With 
respect to the expectation that state leaders would voluntarily change 
their behaviour, Booth was scathing: “Look at some heads of 
governments or heads of state. Can we hope that this ‘community’ of 
dignitaries and states will deliver the world from massive human 
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wrongs?”89 The fate of R2P, derived from its affirmation of the systemic 
status quo and its strategy of engaging in moral suasion, appears to 
confirm Booth’s fears and, lamentably, ultimately inhibited the 
realisation of human security.  
The power of narrowly defined self-interest among states remains the 
guiding force in international relations. This was readily evident with 
respects to the P5’s response to the Arab Spring. To ignore this and 
assume we can convince these states to change their ways through moral 
advocacy alone is unlikely to achieve positive results. Those supportive 
of the ethos underlying human security and the promotion of human 
rights generally must accept that the goals set can only be realised 
through an acceptance of the limits of moral suasion, the narrow national 
interests of states and the need to think seriously about the contours of a 
radically different international system.  
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